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Leibniz, and Wolf is in due time transformed and celebrates a joyful resurrection as the critical philosophy. Paulsen's whole delineation is dominated by this thought, and one who is not convinced by it need only be reminded of one outward fact: the extraordinary popularity which Kant's philosophy has enjoyed in the second half of our century among all who regarded themselves as the chosen guardians of so-called idealism. It has joined the ranks of the conservative forces. This, indeed, only on the Protestant side, where influential theologians have not only become reconciled to Kant's philosophy, but have seen in it a rallying-point of faith. Catholicism is to-day, more than ever, separated by an impassable gulf from all other intellectual systems. It makes no effort to attain even a measure of harmony with the great currents of intellectual life, but only to construct a sphere of its own and to bring all the others into it. It sees in Kant only a system of negations—a shadowy world filled only with phenomena,—sees the resolution of those supersensual truths, which should be the foundations of all certainty, into mere postulates, i. e., into pious wishes and ungrounded hopes. There are some details of this criticism of Kant with which we are inclined to agree, but no one can survey the totality of his mighty philosophic fabric, and receive without prejudice the impression which it makes as presented anew in Paulsen's treatise, without being filled with reverence for the serious and lofty disposition with which he undertook to save from the ruins of a decaying world the things of the highest spiritual value, casting them into a new mold, as well as for the unity of his conception which is nowhere missing throughout his whole wide system.

VIENNA. FRIEDRICH JODL.

FRANCE.

There is not so much difficulty in clearly epitomising the newest little book of M. G. TARDE,—*The Laws of Society*, as there is in giving a critical estimate of its importance as a *sketch of sociology*, for such is the subtitle of this work and a clear definition of its lofty aim. M. Tarde is so prolific in ideas, at times of a startling nature, and has expounded them in such densely packed volumes, that it has not infrequently been his misfortune to be misunderstood. He has, accordingly, himself felt the need of exhibiting to his readers the secret bond which unites his three great works—*Les Lois de l'imitation*, *L'Opposition universelle*, and *La Logique sociale*—the bond by which coherency has been imparted to the *membra disjecta* of a single systematic conception, or rather a science of society, which is absolutely new, and whose true character I am desirous of justly appreciating.

Facts are presented to us, according to M. Tarde, under the three main aspects which he has considered in his studies and which are: *repetitions* (there is no science save the science of the general, that is to say, of the individual considered as repeated or as susceptible of being repeated indefinitely): *oppositions* (science seeks the opposites inherent in reality, whereby it studies the destruction as well as the creation of phenomena); and *adaptations* (progressive co-ordination). Repetition, opposition, adaptation, these are "the three different keys by which science unlocks the secrets of the universe." Let us see first what M. Tarde understands by this in the case of repetition.

Scientific progress, he justly remarks, consists in "beginning with single repetitions, or a very small number of repetitions, which are of an imposing and obtrusive character, and in reaching by their consideration an infinity of infinitesimal likenesses and repetitions, real and elementary, which have furnished by their appearance an explanation of the initial repetitions"; and this important remark is not only applicable to repetitions; it is also applicable to oppositions and adaptations. It is restricted, I should say, to establishing the progress of analysis which alone prepares the way for and permits of broader and more exact syntheses. The same advance is accordingly observed everywhere,—in sociology, as in astronomy, botany, or biology. Just as science has substituted for the apparent rotation of the heaven in its entirety the actual facts of a multitude of minor rotations, so also for the historical cycles which Plato assumes, Aristotle substituted detailed repetitions, which are very frequently true, and thinkers have since established the partial evolution of certain broad and general facts, such as family, property, etc., which it is permissible to analyse still farther into secondary facts. But M. Tarde does not stop here; he is anxious to reach the "elementary repetitions," which are for him the "action of one mind on another mind." The laws of repetition, accordingly, are to sociology what the laws of habit and heredity are to biology, the laws of gravitation to astronomy, and the laws of undulation to physics.

The same remark and the same conclusion are applicable to oppositions and adaptations; for instance, the gross and obvious oppositions of life and death, of youth and old age in biology have been replaced by the infinitesimal oppositions of the oxidation and deoxidation of each single cell, the accumulation and expenditure of force, in all the varied forms of "struggle" or "rhythm"; while at the same time still more profound dissymmetries have been discovered, such as the functional dissymmetry of the two hemispheres of the brain. In sociology we see war reduced to competition and competition to discussion. The "elementary" social opposition finally is to be found in the interior of every individual, in every case that such an individual hesitates between two contrary directions. Just as rhythm and opposition promote repetition directly and variation indirectly, so struggle produces adaptation. And this is the profoundest aspect under which science envisages the universe. To the gigantic geocentric adaptation of the early conception succeeded the partial harmony of the solar system, of the planets with their satellites, etc.; likewise, the "single drama" to which Comte reduces history has made way for the social dramas of Spencer, and these in their turn must be resolved in "elementary" social adaptation, which is that of two men of whom the one is the teacher and the other the learner, and of whom one commands and the other obeys,—or, profounder still, that of two ideas in the brain of a single man. "At the bottom of every association between men," says M. Tarde, "there is originally an association between the ideas of some single man."

In all cases, accordingly, we reach the individual, "the brain of the genius" who invents and who decides, and from whom all proceeds—in a word, individual or collective psychology. The grand stream of history has a primitive source, viz., invention, and likewise a final destination, viz., the formation of superior personalities.

Such is the central conception, alike new and remarkable, of M. Tarde. What is its significance for the establishment of sociology? That is the question. I see no other way of deciding this point than by considering what is meant by the establishment of a science. The establishing of a science—I may say again at the risk of repetition—is nothing but the determining of how certain successions of facts vary as the function of certain other successions, or correlatively with certain other successions, and the formulating of the laws of these variations whenever it is possible to extricate such laws from the complexity of phenomena. This is the method which all scientists follow, and sociology can form no exception. M. Tarde will doubtless not dispute this truth; but what in his conception are social facts? At the outset he appears to accept only psychological facts; nevertheless, he does not refuse to recognise that there exist other facts which are the product of the "socialised" individual activity—like the monuments of art, religion, government, economical institutions, etc., which once created may be said to constitute in their turn important factors of that "collective psychology" to which M. Tarde claims to have reduced the science of societies. If science, and this is the starting-point of our definition, is necessarily founded on the comparison of social facts, conducted with a view of exhibiting their simultaneous and successive variations, would not the wisest course be to accept these facts as they are, in the mass and as results solidified so to speak in the concrete form of institutions, or in the numeral form of statistics, leaving out of account the underlying psychological conditions? Is it not true that the study of these last belongs to a particular science which enters sociology but does not constitute it?

As to the second point, which is the formulating of the laws of variation of social facts, the doctrine of M. Tarde seems to enjoin us from seeking to discover any laws which are not simple laws of psychology. He is averse to conceiving laws of history; he does not see in history a single definite route, but "a net-work of highways with innumerable cross-roads." He is averse also to the theory that social phenomena have definite tendencies or directions. But let us not exaggerate this point. M. Tarde recognises one fact which is preponderating; this fact is scientific invention. Invention determines certain "common tendencies" which the system of history follows in the various spheres of evolution; it is even calculated to lead evolution toward an ideal goal which is final harmony, or a more perfect adaptation of individuals and collectivities. But is this not tantamount to returning to the doctrine of Comte which connects historical development in its entirety with a psychological fact, while still investing the "social fact" with an independent and objective character? And if Comte prematurely flatters himself upon having marked out a definite route for the human mind, and upon having formulated the laws of succession of scientific discoveries, is not M. Tarde wrong in having hesitated to take advantage of his own "dominant fact" to explain the grand aggregate succession of social phenomena which he neither exactly denies nor accepts?

As to the analogies upon which he takes his stand,—the facts which he calls elementary, the imitating of one man by another man, opposition and adaptation of two ideas in the brain of the same individual,—can these facts in so far as they are ultimate facts of analysis really play the same part and render the same service in sociology as gravitation does in astronomy, the undulation of the ether or the mechanical equivalent of heat in mechanics? What M. Tarde succeeds best in bringing out is on the one hand the function of the individual factor and the significance of the psychological situations which are transformed into social states; but the description of these situations cannot supplant the description of the states into which they are transformed, and the social states have, as compared with the individual situations, an originality and peculiar quality of existence such as the most complicated physical facts never present as compared with the elementary functions of vibration, molecular arrangement, and the transformation of heat and work. Even the acceptance of the doctrine of M. Tarde would not absolve us from applying to the study of social facts methods which are quite foreign to the study of the facts of psychology, however legitimate in some regards the consideration of social science as collective psychology may be.

The second point which M. Tarde has sought to place in relief is the relation of the psychological forces to the other forms of energy in the universe—the analogy, vague though it be at present, by which it is possible to connect our states of consciousness with the general rhythm of the phenomena of the world. But this is pre-eminently a philosophical view,—a view which reaches beyond sociology as it reaches also beyond astronomy, physics, and biology; but far be it from my thought to depreciate the ability and originality of this conception ; it has not been my intention in these few and meager passages to pass any strictures whatever upon the sociological theory of so eminent a writer as M. Tarde, and I entreat him to see in it only a sincere effort toward comprehension.

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M. Edmond Goblot presents us with an essay on the classification of the sciences, *Essai sur la classification des sciences;* it is the best work with which I am acquainted in this important branch of philosophy. M. Goblot remains faithful to the controlling idea of Comte, while at the same time correcting, completing and improving his doctrine. Spencer, let it be said, has rather confounded and complicated the problem. The succession of the sciences remains in the system of M. Goblot unilinear, and continues to form a hierarchy. The reason for this "single" hierarchy is given us in the "formal unity" of science; the task of every science consisting essentially in its disengaging itself from the concrete knowledge of things, in order to contemplate them from an abstract point of view, from which the human mind embraces beings and phenomena as they are given, and as they are possible, or simply conceivable. As to the reason for the several stages of this hierarchy, it is founded on the diversity of the points of view of the sciences, that is, on the existence of irreducible general concepts which have been successively introduced into it. M. Goblot abandons, therefore, at the start, the distinction between sciences as abstract, deductive, and ideal, and sciences as concrete, experimental, and real. Mathematics, which are an example of the first, is the type, according to him, toward which the second which are the sciences of nature ultimately tend. This does not mean that there are no special and descriptive sciences: we shall see that M. Goblot assigns to these their right places in his classification by basing them upon a very simple consideration.

In the first rank we find arithmetic and algebra, which are the sciences of quantity; in the second rank, geometry, which is the science of space. Mechanics takes third rank as the science of motion and of forces. M. Goblot justly observes that the idea of motion is not irreducible, as is that of space and that of time. It must be constructed by means of a true definition. Like the sciences of quantity and space, rational mechanics begins by establishing special propositions and proceeds by successive generalisations. It offers the best example of that evolution by which sciences which were inductive at the start have become deductive in development from the moment their elementary notions were elucidated and their essential definitions formulated.

The fourth place is assigned to cosmology, which includes physics and chemistry, which are here characterised much more exactly than they were by Comte, and also by M. de Roberty. With Chevreul, M. Goblot assigns to physics the study of the general properties of bodies; to chemistry that of concrete species. In the title, *Theoretical Cosmology*, he distinguishes pure abstract or general cosmology on the one hand, and applied or concrete cosmology on the other; the latter forming three groups together with chemistry and mineralogy, in so far as these are systematic or special studies (the study of species *per se*), with astronomy and physical geography in so far as these are descriptive studies (the distribution of creatures and phenomena in space), with cosmogony and geology in so far as these are historical studies (distribution in time). Corresponding to the aggregate group of theoretical cosmology are the mechanical arts which make particular use of cosmological knowledge.

With life a reality of a new order is introduced which does not represent mechanism, and which makes of physiology an autonomous science. Pleasure and pain are fundamental notions without which there would be no psychology nor physiology. These two sciences are interconnected and inseparable. M. Goblot apparently establishes with biology a fifth order or rank of classification in which we find the same principle of subdivision as in cosmology. But he goes farther and seeks to group the science of life and social science under a single title, bio-psycho-sociology, which he subdivides in the following manner. The theoretical part embraces on the one hand the pure or general science, that is physiology (the laws of the organic, psychological, and social functions of all living beings), on the other hand, the applied sciences which are divided into, (1) special sciences (the systematic order), including botany, zoölogy, anthropology, the organic, psychological, and social properties of every species; (2) the geographical sciences (the order in space), including biology, linguistic, economic, political geography, etc.); (3) the historical sciences (the order in time), including paleontology, history, etc. Hygiene and therapeutics, understood in their broadest significance, correspond, under the title of practical sciences or arts, to this aggregate of theoretical studies, pure and applied.

Ethics for M. Goblot is merely an application of theoretical knowledge, which is science in its entirety. I agree with this view, on the condition that it be not forgotten that ethics, like esthetics, always belongs in one of its aspects to psychology, that is, to pure science. Logic appears to have embarrassed the author; he is unable to classify it with mathematics, as Spencer has done not without good reason in his group of "formal" sciences, but he classifies it resolutely with esthetics, ethics, and religion itself, all these different branches ultimately aiming at realising "the communion of all intellects,"—whereby they may be considered as together forming a branch of sociology.

It remains to be said with regard to sociology that M. Goblot defines it as "a science of general services, both gratuitous and for a compensation." The classification of services, as proposed on page 212 of the book, may possibly be regarded, he says, as an aperçu of the plan of future sociology; this last part of his work, although its discussions are always interesting, may profit by being re-elaborated, but upon the whole and despite a few defects, it is one of great excellence.

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The work of M. ALFRED ESPINAS, *La philosophie sociale du XVIII. siècle et la Révolution*, is a book on which I should like to speak at length. This work, which is the substance of a course delivered by M. Espinas at the University of Paris, is replete with sound erudition and wise reflection. It is a conscientious work, written in a noble style, in which are unrolled before our eyes the great crises of history which were marked by the affirmation of socialism as a doctrine, and of which the French Revolution and the revolutionary storms of 1848 were the last expression. In opposition to those who see in the French Revolution an individualistic movement, engendered by an individualistic philosophy, M. Espinas does not hesitate to discover in it the practical application by illegal means of the equalitarian philosophy which made its appearance in the eighteenth century, and which implied a collectivist theory of the rôle of the state. He carefully notes the effective consequences of this theory from Mirabeau to Robespierre and Babeuf. Babouvism is not for M. Espinas a freak of history, an accident; it is the natural culmination and last expression of Jacobinism.

It certainly would not be exact to say that the laws which have been bequeathed to the assemblies of the Revolution are laws of socialism; but these laws were not promulgated until the ancient proprietors had been dispossessed, and the upstarts had been invested with their spoils; and these laws are the echo rather of the appetites of the newcomers than of the equalitarian ideal of pure Jacobinism. It would not be exact to assert that the movement of 1789 has done no good by any of its undertakings, and M. Espinas is far from making such an assertion; but he does not ignore the fact that what good the Revolution did do could have been satisfactorily done without it; he belongs, if I am not mistaken, to that class of historians of whom Alexis de Tocqueville remains the master with his beautiful work, *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution,* and who have cast off the bonds of Jacobin fetishism, and so been able to comprehend and render sound judgment on the events of the last century.

After the rather lengthy examination which I have given these three important works, I shall restrict myself to a mere mention of the following: *Les Pensées de Tolstoi,* translated by M. Ossip Lourie; *Contributions à l'étude de l'hérédité et des principes de la formation des races,* by J. M. Harraca; *Sanctuaires d'Orient, Egypte, Grèce, Palestine,* by Edourd Schuré (Librarie Perrin).[1]

PARIS. LUCIEN ARRÉAT.

PHILOSOPHY IN JAPAN.

Tetsujiro Inouyé, professor of philosophy in the University of Tokio, read a paper on the philosophical development of Japan before the International Congress of Orientalists at Paris, in his capacity of official delegate of the Japanese Government, and we welcome its publication in the *Hansei Zasshi,* because the history of Japanese philosophy is little known outside of the Flowery Kingdom. Professor Inouyé is known as the best authority on the subject; he has enjoyed all the advantages of a Western education, is thoroughly versed in German philosophy, and quite at home in the philosophical world of England and France.

According to the prevalent opinion, there is no originality in Japanese philosophy; but Professor Inouyé insists on the fact that although the first impulse to philosophising came from abroad, being given by Confucianism and Buddhism, the treatment and further development of these great philosophical and religious movements were carried on in an independent way and produced original thinkers in Japan. We trust, however, that he would nevertheless allow that the first period of Japanese philosophy has been concluded, and that from the present day a new epoch begins. And

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[1] The other works mentioned are published by F. Alcan.